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Abstract 
During the past decade, Mercosur has been insistently presented as the 
priority of Brazilian foreign policy. Nevertheless, in this period regional 
integration has neither deepened nor enlarged. This article aims to ex-
plain this gap between discourse and practice by examining how Brazil’s 
regionalism policy is characterized. The analysis is based on a case study 
of the creation of Mercosur’s Parliament in 2006. Theoretically, we 
argue that discursive institutionalism and international regimes theory 
can largely account for the detachment of Brazil from Mercosur and 
the limited interdependence that has been built among these countries. 
The conclusion points to the induction of a low-impact regionalism that 
facilitates Brazil’s actions at the international level. 
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In practical terms, 
maybe we shouldn’t have so 
much confidence in the strict 
majority vote in international 
organizations and more 
confidence in the concurrent 
majority requirement and the 
forms of representation that are 
created. (Deutsch, 1981: 232)
Resumen
En el último decenio se ha insistido en señalar que el Mercosur tiene 
prioridad en la política exterior del Brasil. Sin embargo, durante este 
tiempo la integración regional no ha aumentado ni se ha profundizado. 
El presente artículo procura explicar este vacío entre el discurso y la 
práctica mediante un examen de las características de la política brasile-
ña en materia de regionalismo. El análisis  se basa en un estudio de caso 
sobre la creación del Parlamento del Mercosur en 2006. En principio, 
sostenemos que en gran medida el institucionalismo discursivo y la 
teoría de los sistemas internacionales pueden explicar por qué Brasil ha 
mantenido distancia del Mercosur y la limitada interdependencia que se 
ha construido entre los países que lo componen. La conclusión  apunta 
a que se ha producido un regionalismo débil que facilita la acción del 
Brasil en el plano internacional. 
Palabras clave: Brasil, regionalismo, Parlamento del Mercosur, po-
lítica exterior
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In the field of foreign policy, the 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) 
had always been the declared priority 
of the Brazilian government under 
Lula. Strengthening relations with its 
South American neighbors, mainly with 
Argentina, was considered strategic by 
the government. Regional integration 
already had a preeminent place in the 
2002 Worker’s Party’s (PT, abbreviation 
in Portuguese) Government Program, 
referred to as the main foreign poli-
cy tool at the very beginning of the 
document. Reconstructing Mercosur 
through policy-coordination and the 
creation of political and juridical insti-
tutions was seen as a «decisive element» 
in this area (Palocci, 2002: 6). In his 
first international visit as president, in 
December 2002, Lula stated in Bue-
nos Aires that Mercosur deserved an 
«urgent deepening through concrete 
proposals»1. On that occasion, he 
expressly mentioned the need for com-
mon institutions to improve political 
cooperation, proposing the creation 
of a directly elected parliament. In the 
following years, Brazil was indeed a 
central actor in the establishment of 
the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) in 
2006.
Nevertheless, Parlasur was one of 
Mercosur’s very few achievements of 
the 2000s. Structural funds were appro-
1 «Lula propõe aprofundamento urgente do 
Mercosul», UOL Últimas Notícias, 12 
December 2002. Available at http://
noticias.uol.com.br/inter/afp/2002/12/02/
ult34u54542.jhtm , Accessed in 2 
September 2012. 
ved in the same «parliamentary packa-
ge» as a means of convincing Uruguay 
and mostly Paraguay of agreeing to the 
assembly. But the main barriers to the 
consolidation of the common market 
still persisted, such as limitations to free 
trade, difficulties in managing and ex-
panding the common external tariff and 
the lack of free movement of people and 
policy-harmonization. Governmental 
discourse about regional integration in 
the end did not turn into practice, which 
became more evident during Lula’s se-
cond mandate. The 2006 Government 
Program barely mentioned Mercosur, 
which was discreetly included in the to-
pic «Sovereign insertion in the world» 
(Garcia, 2006: 14). From 2007 on, the 
government devoted its attention to 
broad South-South relations, enhancing 
its dialogue with Asian and African 
partners. Latin America was still a 
priority, but attention was focused on 
new agreements rather than to the older 
Mercosur. This trend continues in the 
first years of Dilma’s presidency.
Do these events represent a change 
in the Brazilian policy for regionalism 
or the continuity of a strategy initiated 
some years ago? This article aims to 
analyze the motivations behind Bra-
zilian decisions in the regional arena. 
In order to do so, we first present the 
theoretical bases of our analysis. They 
are guided by the idea according to 
which regional integration in Latin 
American in general, and in Mercosur 
in particular, is not able to surpass the 
so-called interdependence threshold, 
that is, to achieve real economic in-
44
Estudios Internacionales 175 (2013) • Universidad de Chile
tegration capable of creating a new 
register for politics beyond the nation-
state. Brazil represents more than 2/3 of 
the wealth, population and territory of 
Mercosur and its trade exchanges are 
progressively more diversified. This in-
terdependence threshold is accentuated 
by the relative cultural eccentricity of 
Brazil in relation to Latin America. In 
spite of sharing historical experiences 
with its Spanish-speaking neighbors, 
Brazil often adopts an isolationist 
position reinforced by its continental 
dimensions and its particular coloni-
zation process (Galvão, 2009: 74). As 
Fernand Braudel (apud Martinière, 
1978: 41) states, «Latin America is 
not ‘one’, a homogenous entity… it is 
‘one’ by contrast, by opposition, taken 
in its continental mass, opposed to the 
other continents, but it doesn’t prevent 
it from being deeply divided». 
The second part sheds light on the 
Mercosur’s main institutional evolu-
tion during the past years: the creation 
of Parlasur. Brazilian support for the 
regional parliament contributes to the 
understanding of the Brazilian perspec-
tive on Mercosur itself. We argue that 
the intention of prioritizing regional 
integration was limited and more of a 
rhetorical exercise than a real policy. 
Instead of deepening Mercosur, autho-
rities were looking to consolidate Brazil 
as an emerging power by re-launching 
South-South relations. This strategy 
confirms the persistency of the Nation-
State in contemporary politics and new 
ways regionalism is being applied in the 
21st century. 
Brazilian foreign policy 
and Mercosur: between 
discourse and instrumental 
rationality
Within Latin America, Brazil’s case 
is emblematic especially because its 
economy is the least dependent on 
Mercosur. With the economic reforms 
initiated during Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Lula’s governments, Brazil 
began a process of detachment, distan-
cing itself from Mercosur and acting on 
its own. Positive results of these reforms 
have increased the power asymmetries 
among Mercosur countries. This deta-
chment can be explained through the 
combination of two theories related to 
institutional change: discursive insti-
tutionalism and international regimes 
perspective.
According to Vigevani and Cepaluni 
(2007: 1310), there is no important 
rupture in Brazilian foreign policy in 
the period 1994-2010, but simply dis-
tinct emphases on already established 
objectives. Both Fernando Henrique 
and Lula’s governments searched to 
achieve economic development and 
political autonomy with their external 
actions. Differences lie in the degree of 
autonomy and how it is maximized: 
through distance, participation or di-
versification (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 
2007: 1313). Discursive institutiona-
lism perspective treats change as an 
endogenous process, thus offering a 
prominent place to Nation-States in 
regional integrations. It relativizes the 
direct impact of exogenous actions, 
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arguing that discourse and ideas should 
be taken seriously to explain institutio-
nal change. Discursive institutionalism 
«is concerned with both the substantive 
content of ideas and the interactive 
processes of discourse in institutional 
context» (Schmidt, 2010: 1). Peter and 
Ernst Haas have also worked on the 
relations between ideas and the prag-
matic tradition, mixing the cornersto-
nes for constructivism and philosophy 
of science. According to these authors, 
«pragmatic constructivism seeks to lo-
cate ideas about politics and the world 
within the social conditions from which 
they emerge, or are constructed» (2002: 
574). All of these authors emphasize the 
importance of epistemic communities 
as innovations, both in order to explain 
institutional change and to influence the 
conception of foreign policy. 
The elaboration of Brazilian foreign 
policy has not always been followed by 
effective implementation. Differences 
among discourse, diplomatic practice 
and real institutionalization are not 
new and they have strongly marked 
this field in the last decade2. From the 
1980s on, regional integration has be-
come central in the discourse related 
to foreign policy. Simon Bolivar’s idea 
was appropriated by decision-makers 
and became a real leitmotiv. In spite of 
the functionalist vocation of Mercosur, 
in light of the failures of the Andean 
2  Further research could clarify if this gap 
results from internal constraints in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or from a 
presidential diplomacy with a political 
character.
Pact, its contractual ambitions are 
still beyond the effective capacity of 
its members to reach agreement. The 
fact that the common external tariff 
is not completely implemented reveals 
the development asymmetries and the 
gap between discourse and practice. 
In fact, Mercosur has been diffusing a 
self-image quite different from the facts, 
which is reflected in the representa-
tions built by the Brazilian discourse. 
During a Mercosur summit in 2004, 
Lula affirmed that «our project of de-
velopment is not only national. It also 
includes the regional dimension. Brazil’s 
prosperity has to be the prosperity of 
our regional partners. The Brazilian 
economy has entered a phase of solid 
growth. We now have the ability to in-
crease trade and cooperation with our 
neighbors»3. Nevertheless, economic 
data shows that this prosperity has 
not caused an increase in trade within 
Mercosur. Externally, it seems to be 
based on the individual participation of 
Brazil in forums like the BRICS, BASIC 
or G-20. Internally, it has been guiding 
the implementation of public policies 
aimed to decrease the heterogeneity of 
the national territory, which is marked 
by strong inequality4. Mercosur has not 
3  See Lula’s discourse during the XVI 
Mercosur Summit, Puerto Iguazú, 
Argentina, 8 July 2004. Resenha de 
Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 95, 2º 
semestre de 2004, p. 36.
4  «After achieving its peak in 1997-98 
(17%), intra-Mercosur trade has 
decreased. Exports to third countries have 
grown much faster than inside the bloc. 
Neither Mercosur institutions nor the 
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been able to establish institutional ven-
ues for the redistribution of Brazilian 
prosperity beyond its national borders5.
This situation did not prevent Bra-
zilian authorities from continuing to 
construct a discourse that is far from 
reality but seeks to legitimate regional 
integration and, by extension, Brazilian 
foreign policy itself. Lula’s efforts to es-
tablish a parliament in Mercosur can be 
understood in this context. Five years 
after the official inauguration, Parlasur’ 
progress is limited and the established 
agenda has yet to be accomplished. The 
main problems are related to the imple-
mentation of proportional composition 
and direct elections6. 
Consequently, Mercosur seems to 
present two faces: the real one, defined 
Brazilian Market could offer demands 
which would enable Member States to 
diversify and develop their economies». 
Rubens Ricupero, «Integração dos países 
do Mercosul tem ameaças vindas de fora 
e de dentro», Folha de São Paulo, 31 
January 2011.
5  FOCEM’s creation is a timid and limited 
initiative. «The Fund for Structural 
C o n v e r g e n c e  a n d  I n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Reinforcement of Mercosur (FOCEM) 
aims at deepening the integration process 
in the Southern Cone through asymmetries 
reduction, economic incentives and the 
building of social cohesion among Member 
States». Available at  http:/ /www.
p l ane j amen to . gov.b r / s e c r e t a r i a .
asp?cat=156&sub=279&sec=10, Accessed 
on 7 February 2013.
6  «Parlasur discute sobre elecciones 
directas», Parlasur Website. Available at 
http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/
innovaportal /v/4993/1/secretaria/
parlasur_discute_sobre_elecciones_
directas.html, Access on 8 February 2013.
mainly by economic principles, and 
the virtual one, guided by discursive 
bases referring to the «integrationist 
vocation» and the collective identity 
of the Latin-American peoples7. This 
virtual face is nourished by epistemic 
communities often linked to the Eu-
ropean Union, which try to influence 
national and regional institutions. Civil 
society organizations also take part 
in this process, but in a limited way. 
According to the Brazilian ministry 
of foreign affairs, «when people ask if 
Mercosur is going through a crisis and 
what we will do to save it, I would say 
Mercosur is no longer the property of 
governments. Today Mercosur belongs 
to societies, to peoples, and peoples of 
Mercosur will not let this process fail».8 
Nevertheless, in reality, Mercosur is still 
an intergovernmental project. Social 
mobilization is minimal and limited 
to a few sectors, even if some regional 
institutions are meant to support and 
increase this participation.
Conflict between discourse and ac-
tion is quite common in domestic and 
foreign policies. The case of Mercosur 
is nevertheless distinguished by at least 
two factors. First, there is a conceptual 
7  «The starting point for collective identity 
construction, as argues Bovero, is the idea 
of a common good or interest that leads 
people to affirm an identity by similarity, 
based on a shared vision of this common 
good or interest» (Lafer, 2009: 15).
8  See Celso Amorim’s discourse, Brazilian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, XXXII 
Mercosur Summit, Rio de Janeiro, 18 
January 2007. Resenha de Política Exterior 
do Brasil, n. 100, 1º semestre de 2007, p. 43.
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gap regarding the Nation-State. Dis-
course recognizes regional policies that 
could weaken the State, whereas actions 
indicate a state-centric perspective that 
tends to reinforce national institutions. 
Second, discourse is still able to gener-
ate legitimizing representation, as it 
competes with citizens’ imaginary and 
could eventually modify the current 
situation, even if in a marginal and 
gradual way.
Brazil’s relative cultural and ide-
ational eccentricity regarding Latin 
Americanism limits the effects of its 
discourse. Bolivar had a cautious vision 
of the Brazilian Empire that contradicts 
the employment of his ideas by the Bra-
zilian diplomacy9. This functional ob-
stacle nourishes Brazil’s non-Hispanic 
argument, motivating its exclusion 
and creating a unique position for the 
country in the continent. This position 
reduces the discourse’s impact and 
scope, because both the speaker and 
listener share a lack of conviction on a 
common identity. Even if it is repeated, 
the acceptance of this discourse is com-
promised and becomes a vulnerable 
convention (Onuf, 1998: 64).
Brazil’s recent and gradual process 
of detachment from Mercosur dynam-
9  «After starting the Independence process 
of Gran Colombia (Colombia, Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Panama), Peru and Bolivia, 
Bolívar had a preventive behavior towards 
Brazil. The common identity of Hispano-
Amer ican  repub l i c s  produced  a 
differentiation universe founded in three 
sectors: Iberian Peninsula, North America 
and the imperial-lusophone neighbor 
(Galvão, 2009: 74).
ics is also partially due to the intrinsic 
debility of Brazilian authorities’ dis-
course concerning regional identity, al-
though the absence of such a discourse 
would probably accentuate this process. 
Globalization has contributed to the 
building of a Latin-American identity 
anchored on the shortening of time 
and space variables, which contributes 
to the increased interdependence on 
international actors. The Nation-State 
is thus compelled to adapt to the new 
demands from the outside through the 
redimensioning of its identity. As in the 
bounded rationality concept (Camp-
bell, 2004), the State is called upon 
to decide on its place within this new 
power balance10.
A leadership instinct has always 
been exalted within Brazilian foreign 
policy debates. A territory with conti-
nental dimensions, a large population 
and, more recently, economic reasons 
have encouraged the notion that Brazil 
«can renounce many things, but not its 
grandeur»11. By action or inertia, the 
sole presence of Brazil seems to engen-
der a gravitational effect which influ-
ences its South-American neighbors. 
This impact is related to leadership, 
from the perspective of Brazilian deci-
10  «Bounded rationality refers to the limited 
capacities of actors to collect and process 
important information and use it to make 
well-informed decisions» (Campbell, 
2004: 16).
11  Available at http://www.politicaexterna.
com/15427/depoimentos-sobre-antonio-
azeredo-da-silveira-chanceler-de-ernesto-
geisel-1974-1979, Accessed on 11 
February 2013.
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was meant to respond to the demands 
of new international regimes, favor-
ing State unity rather than Mercosur 
regional integration. If foreign policy 
is understood as a public policy seek-
ing to «translate domestic needs into 
external possibilities in order to expand 
a society’s control over its own destiny» 
(Lafer, 2009: 16), Brazil’s choice does 
not correspond to Mercosur. As it often 
happens in regionalism processes, citi-
zens’ identity is still national, especially 
in Brazil14. The international society15 
concept fits better with this reality than 
the idea of a world society16. Although 
it is increasingly interdependent on 
other actors in economic terms, the 
Nation-State is still the main arena for 
14  The formulation of foreign policy is 
gradually less hermetic to public opinion, 
mainly in countries such as the United 
States, United Kingdom or France. In 
Brazil, in spite of the historical isolation 
of decision-making in foreign policy 
(Faria, 2008), the interdependence 
between domestic and external levels seem 
to admit incipient voices coming from civil 
society and Legislative and Judiciary 
powers.
15  «International society exists when a group 
of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set 
of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the working of common 
institutions» (Bull, 2002: 13).
16  «From a Burtonian perspective, identity 
is a central need for individuals but a need 
that can be met without conflict. That 
identity often seems a source of conflicts 
is misleading – it is the use of state power 
to buttress an identity that creates conflict» 
(Brown, 2001: 10). 
sion-makers, or hegemony, according of 
many of its partners12. The «responsible 
activism»13 evoked by Lula’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs thus embraced two 
strategies. The first was based on a 
regionalist discourse whose results 
became concrete in institutions like the 
Parlasur or in «an increasing number of 
relatively intrusive norms and regula-
tions» (Spektor, 2010: 27). The second 
reflects a rational choice strategy that 
12  According to the instrumental rationality 
perspective, the reason for this hegemonic 
exercise is the search for assuring the 
quality of survival in comparison to the 
partners (Elias, 1991). This instrumental 
rationality of positivist nature is not 
absolute, though. It is limited by cognitive 
processes and also by historical influences 
that induce path dependence mechanisms. 
Therefore, hegemony is here interpreted 
in a conciliatory way, like Pedersen (2002) 
or Burges (2008). The hegemony concept 
may be assimilated to leadership. The 
difference is that the latter is based on the 
idea of policy imposition, whilst the 
second is based on the idea of policy 
suggestion. In this last case, the objectives 
of the preponderant actor are also those 
of his partners (Malamud, 2009). 
13  «Brazilian people have given a great 
demonstration of self-esteem when 
expressing faithful in the possibility of 
creatively changing reality. We have to 
bring this behavior of responsible activism 
to the field of external action. We will not 
fail to be an engaged protagonist, always 
defending the national interest and our 
values». Celso Amorim, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1 January 2003. Available 
at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-
imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/2003/01/
discurso-proferido-pelo-embaixador-
celso-amorim/, Accessed on 11 February 
2013.
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social relations and for the building of 
political community17. In addition, this 
interdependence does not necessarily 
happen within regionalism processes. 
The lack of mutual linkage does not 
allow Brazil to surpass the interdepen-
dence threshold that limits economic 
integration within Mercosur. In 2009, 
the bloc was responsible for only 
10.3% of Brazilian trade18, whereas 
the rate between Germany and the 
European Union (EU) reached 60.59% 
in 200819. The EU is therefore more es-
sential to Germany than Mercosur is to 
Brazil, even if the Brazilian percentage 
includes several industrialized products. 
Functionally, it is more evident for 
Germany than it is to Brazil to assume 
the paymaster role, considering the 
concrete advantages these countries 
can get from integration. Therefore, 
this trade deficiency added to Brazil’s 
desire to become a global trader that 
has been guiding Brazilian foreign 
policy, has contributed to the growing 
distance between Brazil and Mercosur. 
However, this distance has not pre-
vented Brazil from developing a form of 
instrumental activism when it comes to 
17  «Political community (...) is a condition 
in which specific groups and individuals 
show more loyalty to their central political 
institutions than to any other political 
authority, in a specific period of time and 
in a definable geographic space» (Haas, 
2004: 5).
18  Balança Comercial Brasileira: dados 
consolidados, Secretaria de Comércio 
Exterior do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, 
Indústria e Comércio Exterior, 2009.
19  External and intra-European Union trade 
Monthly statistics, issue number 10/2009.
Latin-American regionalism. «In trade 
negotiations, many times Brazil makes 
efforts to be recognized as a country 
that does not speak only for itself, but 
as an interlocutor that may speak in the 
name of a group of countries» (Spektor, 
2010: 27).
This strategy has not been well 
received by some South American and 
therefore has not helped to unblock 
important negotiations, such as that 
between Mercosur and the EU. Ne-
gotiations were opened in 1994 to be 
later suspended in 2004. In 2010, an 
initiative of the European Commission 
launched new meetings. This commer-
cially difficult decade for EU-Mercosur 
relations has stimulated Brazil, in spite 
of its regionalist discourse, to look for 
alternatives to reinforce its relations 
with Europe outside the Mercosur 
framework. The Strategic Partnership 
between the EU and Brazil was signed 
in this context, comprising five areas 
– one of which is named «promotion 
of economic, social and environmental 
partnership»20. Even if negotiations 
cannot include tariffs, Brazil is only 
allowed to do so with its Mercosur 
partners, they represent a privileged 
forum for trade matters and can stimu-
late changes in Brazilian policy towards 
regionalism.
Another strategy that reflects Bra-
zilian state-centrism, is the marginal 
20  Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/
130&format=HTML&aged=0&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en, Accessed on 18 
March 2012.
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role of dispute-settlement mechanisms 
within Mercosur. Juridical instruments 
regulating this issue – Brasília and 
Olivos Protocol – have rarely been 
used by Mercosur members, and even 
less by Brazil21. It does not mean that 
there are no disputes among them, 
but simply that they often opt to ad-
dress them through outside arbitrator 
institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This behavior 
affects the credibility of the integration 
process because it expresses the lack of 
confidence of its members have in the 
institutions that they have themselves 
created. It also negatively influences the 
foreseeable future of this system due to 
external partners’ unhappiness. 
In short, Brazil’s detachment from 
Mercosur is a result of an instrumen-
tal rationality that understands the 
Nation-State as a central factor in 
international relations. Mercosur has 
gradually lost its catalyst position in 
favor of international regimes that 
stimulate a more active and diversified 
foreign policy (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 
2007). The costs of adapting Mercosur 
to this choice in order to increase its 
legitimacy have been considered too 
high. The persistent power imbalance 
21  After that the Olivos Protocol entered 
into force, there are five decisions of the 
Permanent Revision Court and two 
decisions from ad hoc tribunals. During 
the Brasília Protocol, there were ten 
decisions from ad hoc tribunals. 
Available at http://www.mercosur.org.
uy/t_generic.jsp?contentid=375&site=1
&channel=secretaria&seccion=6, 
Accessed on 21 March 2012.
that characterizes relations among Ar-
gentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil 
as well as historical particularities that 
differentiate the latter seem to block the 
institutional evolution of regionalism. 
Deutsch (1981: 224) has remarked that 
«the problem of the balance of power 
among members may have been impor-
tant in the cases of North-American 
and Suisse federations, for none of the 
member states in these political com-
munities were much stronger than the 
others».
The symbolic value of Parlasur 
cannot be neglected in this context. 
In spite of its clear limitations in the 
decision-making process, its institu-
tional edification promotes a debate 
on legitimacy, due to the fact that it has 
created a regional public space. Similar 
to the EU, Mercosur has always flirted 
with supranationalism. Social and 
political sectors have often questioned 
the intergovernmental option, advanc-
ing that supranational institutions and 
the majority rule would be perhaps be 
best fit to respond to international chal-
lenges. The next section deals with the 
process of creation of Parlasur, aiming 
to interpret the motivations Brazilian 
actors and their expectations concern-
ing the role of the new assembly in the 
Mercosur’s institutional framework. 
Analyzing this important change in 
Mercosur may shed light on Brazil’s 
true policy for regionalism over the 
past years.
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Brazil’s role in the 
political reinforcement of 
Mercosur
In 2003, when Lula became the 
Brazilian president, Mercosur was still 
recuperating from a crisis period, pro-
bably the most severe in the history of 
the bloc. The effects of the Southern 
Asian and Russian financial crises of 
1997-1998 were clearly felt in the 
Southern Cone, a region that had not 
completely recovered from the conse-
quences of the devaluation of Mexican 
peso in 1994. By the end of 1998, 
Brazil was immersed in a monetary 
crisis that led the country to ask for the 
support of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). In Argentina, the election 
of opposition forces in 1999, after 
the long period of neoliberal reforms 
conducted by the Menem government, 
added sensitive political factors to the 
financial breakdown that was already 
occurring. As a result, at the end of 
2001, President Fernando de la Rúa 
resigned and the power came back into 
the Justicialists’ hands. All these events 
contributed to destabilize the already 
vulnerable Mercosur: between 1998 
and 2002, the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of member states decreased al-
most 50% and intra-trade significantly 
diminished, as well as its importance 
to national economies (Hoffmann et 
al, 2008: 109).
Since the beginning of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s government, Brazil 
had advocated a purely commercial 
Mercosur. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at that time stated, «the prio-
rity of Brazilian foreign policy must 
be economic development. Mercosur 
is above all an economic integration 
project. Itamaraty works primarily with 
economic and commercial tasks»22. 
However, in order to face the effects of 
the crisis and prevent similar events in 
the future, Mercosur leaders decided 
to reinforce its institutional structure 
(Dabène, 2009: 143). Even the Brazi-
lian liberal government was ready to 
accept, to some extent, an institutional 
reorganization as a means towards 
economic recovery. In 2000, the Com-
mon Market Council (CMC) approved 
decisions concerning macroeconomic 
coordination, concerted international 
commercial agreements and harmo-
nized incentives for production and 
exportation, which constituted a sort 
of «relaunching Mercosur package» 
(Hoffmann et al. 2008: 107). In 2002, 
two new institutions were created: the 
Permanent Revision Court and the 
Sector of Technical Assistance of the 
Mercosur Secretariat. The Court was 
established by the Olivos Protocol, 
which modestly reformed Mercosur’s 
dispute settlement system. It is made 
up of five arbitrators who are «per-
manently available» to review ad hoc 
22  «Mais Brasil, Mais Mercosul: entrevista 
a Luiz Felipe Lampreia», por Álvaro de 
Vasconcelos, O Mundo em Português 
(Instituto de Estudos Econômicos e 
Internacionais), Lisboa, n. 7, abril 2000. 
Avai lab le  a t  ht tp : / /www. iee i .p t /
publicacoes/artigo.php?artigo=1019, 
Accessed on 6 September 2012. 
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judgments or to directly decide upon 
disputes between member states. Within 
the Secretariat, the Technical Assis-
tance Sector was intended to provide 
expertise to Common Market Group’s 
projects and meetings and to conceive 
new methods and ideas in order to 
develop the integration process. The 
four officials hired on a merit basis 
quickly embodied the general interest 
of regional integration (Dabène, 2009: 
99): their high profiles combined with 
serious and independent work would 
stimulate central reforms in Mercosur 
later on.
 In an attempt to revitalize regional 
integration, Lula proposed the crea-
tion of a directly elected parliament 
in Mercosur in a meeting with the 
Committees on External Affairs of the 
Brazilian Congress during his presi-
dential campaign in 2002. According 
to a civil servant, «I nearly felt off my 
chair the moment he mentioned the 
parliament. And a parliament directly 
elected, which surprised me. We were 
barely thinking of a parliament, we 
considered this would be too advanced, 
and he already wanted it elected!»23 On 
the one hand, this ambitious initiative 
reflected the strong tradition of the 
Brazilian Worker’s Party in the field 
of international affairs, which is based 
on the idea of international solidarity 
and on the international dimension of 
the socialist project. According to a 
member of PT’s Executive Board, «the 
international performance of PT has 
23  Civil servant of the Brazilian Congress, 
author’s interview, Brasília, 13 April 2009.
comparison in other Brazilian parties 
of similar size. Left-wing parties used 
to incorporate structures of the state, 
as an international relations branch, 
while seeking to conquer the state. 
Right-wing parties usually do not need 
to do that because they already have the 
state power, so these structures don’t get 
developed at the party level. Also, right-
wing forces have less legitimacy to act 
in the international field because they 
have subordinated the country to ex-
ternal powers for a longtime»24. On the 
other hand, Lula’s proposal reflected 
a pragmatic plan of investing in Mer-
cosur in order to renew the dialogue 
with Argentina and to counterbalance 
ongoing negotiations for the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA).
After the elections, Lula’s govern-
ment immediately turned its attention 
to Mercosur. At that time, at least two 
different positions could be identified 
within PT concerning regional integra-
tion. One pleaded for a political reform 
of Mercosur in order to steer away from 
its neoliberal origins by constructing 
political, social and cultural means 
for integration. The other considered 
Mercosur an organization inevitably 
embedded in a restricted commercial 
logic, which should therefore be repla-
ced by a broader regional project em-
bracing new fields and all of the South 
American countries. While the second 
strategy would progressively gain force 
inside the government over the years, 
24  Member of the Executive Directory of PT, 
author’s interview, Brasília, 4 April 2009.
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the first point of view prevailed at the 
outset because of external constraints. 
Indeed, in the beginning of the 
2000s discussions regarding the FTAA 
dominated Brazilian international eco-
nomic agenda and national debates on 
trade and foreign policy. Popular mobi-
lization tried to challenge this tendency: 
social movements and left-wing parties 
organized periodic demonstrations and 
even an informal national plebiscite 
that rejected the agreement with the 
United States. As a continental free 
trade area would be incompatible with 
the rules of a common market in the 
Southern Cone, the new government 
considered the reinforcement of Mer-
cosur as a useful method to counter 
North American economic intentions in 
the region. «When we arrived, the goal 
was to adapt Mercosur, to use Merco-
sur not anymore as a means to reach 
the FTAA but in favor of an integration 
project. This had positive and negative 
aspects, because from an ideal point of 
view the best would have been to throw 
everything away and to restart from 
zero. But this is not possible in the real 
world. So the politics of the government 
was to embrace Mercosur without 
being limited to it, always staring at a 
step ahead»25. 
Among the team in charge of the 
foreign policy of his government, Lula 
had nominated diplomats and poli-
ticians who did not support Brazil’s 
participation in the FTAA. Samuel 
Pinheiro Guimarães, who later became 
25  Member of the Executive Directory of PT, 
author’s interview, Brasília, 4 April 2009.
the secretary-general of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, had made a strong 
attack against the FTAA negotiations 
during an open meeting organized in 
the Chamber of Deputies in 2001. He 
argued that Mercosur would not resist 
a larger area of free trade including 
the United States and that this would 
have a negative impact on the Brazilian 
economy as well as technology26. The 
special advisor for foreign policy of 
the Presidency, Marco Aurélio Garcia, 
had played an active role within PT’s 
external relations branch for years. He 
was one of the founding fathers of the 
São Paulo Forum, a network of Latin 
American left-wing forces created in 
1990 that opposed «relations of domi-
nation between the United States and 
Latin America» and sought to stimulate 
«an autonomous integration» of the 
region27. 
Mercosur was thus incorporated 
into the government’s strategy of resis-
tance to the FTAA. In some respects the 
bloc as a whole was stronger in raising 
claims regarding intellectual property 
and agriculture. Nonetheless Mercosur 
tariffs and trade regulation became a 
26  Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Verbatim 
report of the Open Meeting on the FTAA 
and Mercosur (2nd Ordinary Meeting of 
the Brazilian Section of Joint Parliamentary 
Committee of Mercosur), Brasília, Federal 
Senate, 11 September 2001.
27  Declaração de São Paulo, I Meeting of the 
São Paulo Forum, 4 July 1990, p. 2. 
A v a i l a b l e  a t  h t t p : / / p t 3 .
dominiotemporarioidc.com/portalpt/dados/
bancoimg/091104150357DeclaracaodeSao
Paulo.doc, Accessed on 5 September 2012.
54
Estudios Internacionales 175 (2013) • Universidad de Chile
useful framework that limited Brazilian 
flexibility in reviewing its standards. In 
2005, during the fourth Summit of the 
Americas in Mar del Plata, Mercosur 
countries decided to officially suspend 
negotiations considering the persistent 
refusal of the United States to discuss 
an eventual revision of the subsidies on 
their domestic agriculture. 
In addition, to counterbalance the 
United States’ efforts to found the 
FTAA, the new Brazilian government 
was also searching to reestablish a 
positive relationship with Argentina 
through Mercosur initiatives. Ani-
mosities between both countries had 
decreased since the rapprochement 
process initiated in 1985 by Sarney 
and Alfonsín presidencies, but had 
not totally disappeared. Indeed, the 
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil 
is motivated by memories of the past 
and by a chronic mistrust which is 
reactivated cyclically (Hirst, 2001: 6). 
These cycles are usually provoked by 
negative reactions from one country 
or the other to unilateral measures in 
the fields of external trade, macroeco-
nomic policies or international politics, 
which was the case during Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Fernando de 
la Rúa’s governments. In 1999, the 
devaluation of the Brazilian currency 
cut into Argentinean industries’ com-
petitiveness, inciting strong backlash. 
Both countries then imposed new tariffs 
on several products, which instigated 
serious disputes within Mercosur. In 
2001, the Argentinean crisis affected 
Brazil’s financial market and disrupted 
bilateral relations once again. By esta-
blishing South America as a priority in 
foreign policy, Lula’s government had 
to increase the level of confidence with 
Argentina. As stated by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, «South America 
is the region which has the closest 
relation with our social and economic 
development and where Brazil may 
have a positive impact and act together 
with states whose evolution also have 
an immediate impact over Brazil. Our 
relation with Argentina is strategic and 
important. It is essential for us that 
Argentina does well»28. Lula himself 
affirmed he «cannot imagine Brazil 
and Argentina apart. These countries 
must not consider each other as an 
adversary. We should see ourselves as 
allies. We will have differences, but they 
will always be smaller than the need for 
union between us»29. 
Aiming to consolidate a sincere and 
open dialogue, Brazil invited Argentina 
to take part in the Brazilian delegation 
to the United Nations’ Security Cou-
28  «Demanda por Lula é muito maior que a 
oferta: entrevista com Celso Amorim», 
Jornal do Brasil, 24 July 2003. Available 
at http://mundorama.net/2003/07/24/
entrevista-do-senhor-ministro-de-estado-
das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso-
amorim-demanda-por-lula-e-muito-
m a i o r - q u e - a - o f e r t a - j o r n a l - d o -
brasi l -24072003/ , Accessed on 5 
September 2012.
29  Entrevista com Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: 
«No puedo imaginar a Brasil y Argentina 
separados», La Nación, 19 April 2009. 
Available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/
nota.asp?nota_id=1119713, Accessed on 
5 September 2012.
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ncil in 2003. Strengthening Mercosur, 
which had gone thought «a fairy-tale 
phase» during the past government30, 
was another way of showing good 
will to such an important neighbor. 
The situation of the Brazilian section 
of the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
(JPC) was not any better than that of 
the Mercosur itself in this period. In the 
Brazilian Congress, «very few people 
knew about the existence of this Com-
mittee. Many people did not think an-
ything of it because it did not have any 
role, it used to do nothing. I remember 
the first meetings I participated in2002, 
they were meetings where there was no 
debate, everyone would leave. It had no 
fundamental role»31. 
With the beginning of PT’s govern-
ment, some parliamentarians from the 
government’s base interested in regional 
integration were selected to play key 
roles within this Committee. Their 
initiatives within the JPC therefore 
benefited from increased institutional 
support. Reinforcing the parliamentary 
dimension of Mercosur became a cen-
tral tactic in the strategy of redirecting 
Mercosur to new purposes, once it was 
decided that it was neither possible nor 
wise to simply abandon it. «One of the 
components of our new position, of ta-
30  Mercosul vinha de uma fase de faz-de-
conta, diz Celso Amorim, Agência Brasil, 
12 December 2003. Available at http://
w w w. s i n d i e x . o r g . b r / s i t e 2 0 0 8 /
m o s t r a c o n t e u d o s . a s p ? c o d _
conteudo=6119, Accessed on 2 September 
2012.
31  Member of the Mercosur Parliament, 
author’s interview, Brasília, 14 April 2009.
king Mercosur and using it in a broader 
sense, was this idea of injecting parti-
cipation, first of civil society, and then 
to construct a democratic institutional 
structure in Mercosur. The Mercosur 
Parliament, with direct elections and 
everything, corresponds to this idea»32. 
During 2003, different diplomatic 
tools were used to convince Argentina 
that a Parliament was desirable in Mer-
cosur. First, traditional diplomacy did 
its job by enhancing political dialogue 
with the Duhalde and Kirchner gover-
nments and by including this subject 
on the agenda whenever the presidents 
met. In a joint declaration of 2003, Lula 
and Duhalde stated, «Mercosur is also 
a political project, which shall count on 
the large participation of all segments 
of societies of the member states. They 
agreed that it is important to reinforce 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
advancing, after consulting the other 
partners, in the direction of a Merco-
sur Parliament, to be elected by direct 
voting in the future»33. 
Second, members of the Brazilian 
Congress employed a means of parlia-
mentary diplomacy to present the po-
tential of a parliament to their Argenti-
nean counterparts. Political discourses, 
32  Member of the Executive Directory of PT, 
author’s interview, Brasília, 4 April 2009.
33  Joint Press Declaration of Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva and Eduardo Duhalde, Brasília, 
14 January 2003. Available at http://
kitplone.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-
imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/2003/01/14/
comunicado-conjunto-de-imprensa-dos-
presidentes-da, Accessed on 2 September 
2012.
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press statements and interviews were 
used to reinforce the idea of creating a 
parliament. Later on, both delegations 
worked to convince Uruguayan and 
Paraguayan deputies of this new idea. 
Third, Mercosur Secretariat’s newly-
hired technical assistants acted tirelessly 
in order to inform deputies, diagnosing 
Mercosur’s economic and institutional 
weaknesses and clarifying potential 
consequences of installing a parliament 
over national and regional politics. 
They saw within the parliament an 
opportunity to open Mercosur to actors 
beyond the Executive powers, thus de-
mocratizing and eventually deepening 
integration. They provided technical 
support for JPC’s meetings and worked 
closely with the Parliamentary Adminis-
trative Secretariat organizing debates 
and seminars on the Parliament. As 
a former technical assistant affirmed, 
«we started a painstaking job, some 
punctual actions. Any document they 
needed, any assistance, we were there. 
We were the technical assistance the 
JPC had never had. I remember the day 
when I took a flight to Buenos Aires 
exclusively to talk with an Argentinean 
deputy. He was very close to Duhalde 
and had considerable political weight. 
He thought that the Mercosur Parlia-
ment was a good idea, but he was not 
passionate. We needed him to deeply 
believe in the idea and then to talk to 
Duhalde. I took a day off work and 
went there because they wanted it to 
be in my words, they wanted me to go 
because I would be able to critically 
answer to his questions»34. 
Not surprisingly, 2003 was a decisi-
ve year in the consolidation of Parlasur. 
This was the time that deputies rejected 
the proposal of a «merely decorative 
Parliament»35 and «presidents said» 
a more ambitious idea was possible36. 
Argentinean and Brazilian delegations 
to JPC started working on concrete 
proposals for the Parliament, which 
were organized and diffused by the 
JPC’s Administrative Secretariat in 
order to facilitate negotiations. Presi-
dents of Mercosur national congresses 
established periodic meetings in order 
to discuss the enhancement of the JPC 
and to develop closer links between 
Mercosur and national parliaments, 
considering that the «complete con-
solidation of an integration process 
requires the constitutions of a common 
legislative branch to express peoples’ 
will»37. The CMC’s Work Program for 
2004-2006 included «the consideration 
of a proposal for the establishment of 
the Mercosur Parliament, to be elabora-
ted by JPC during 2004, following the 
request of the presidents of Mercosur 
34  Former assistant of the Mercosur 
Secretariat, author’s interview, Bordeaux, 
25 March 2010. 
35  Roberto Conde, «Nace el Parlamento del 
Mercosur: ‘Estamos ante a un cambio de 
época’», La República, 6 May 2007.
36  Alfredo Atanasof, Verbatim report of the 
III Plenary Session of Parlasur, Montevideo, 
25 June 2007.
37  Declaration of Presidents of Mercosur 
Parliaments, II Meeting, Asunción, 26 
April 2004.
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member states»38. The path towards the 
Parliament gained force with the victo-
ries in presidential elections of Nestor 
Kirchner in Argentina and Tabaré Vaz-
quez in Uruguay, who were domestic 
forces which were willing to create new 
arenas for political debate in Mercosur 
(Vazquez & Briceño Ruiz, 2009). 
In December 2004, the summit 
celebrating the tenth anniversary of 
the Ouro Preto Protocol was expected 
to approve institutional changes in 
Mercosur, including the installation of 
the Parliament. However, the meeting 
was held in a climate of mutual recri-
minations due to commercial conflicts 
between Argentina and Brazil and could 
not deliver the awaited reforms (Dabè-
ne, 2009: 146). In addition, any attempt 
at deepening regional integration was 
obstructed by the most conservative 
sectors of the diplomacy, very fond of 
the intergovernmental model (Dabène, 
2005: 39). In fact, Mercosur is seen 
by most diplomats within Itamaraty 
as a successful commercial organiza-
tion that should include neither too 
many political mechanisms nor a road 
towards supranationality. 
On the one hand, they used it to 
underline «the positive effects of Mer-
cosur to the economies of the region. 
This is the filet mignon to any diplomat 
of the economic area»39In this sense, a 
member of the Executive board of the 
38  CMC Decision 26/03, Annex III, 
Montevideo, 15 December 2003.
39  Member of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, author’s interview, 
Brasília, 8 April 2009.
powerful Federation of Industries of the 
state of São Paulo (FIESP) observed: «In 
spite of all the complaints, Mercosur 
is still the best weapon in negotiations 
with other blocs and the best market to 
our industrialized products, which face 
difficulties to enter rich countries»40. 
These ideas correspond to the vision of 
pragmatic institutionalists (also called 
liberals), who favor conditioned libera-
lism and support current international 
regimes (Saraiva, 2010: 47). On the 
other hand, diplomats stressed the need 
to avoid models that were conceived in 
other regions, such as Europe. «I simply 
don’t accept documents [from the Euro-
pean Union] saying that the agreement 
with Mercosur is intended to strengthen 
integration within Mercosur. We don’t 
need that. The European model is useful 
to them but should not be transplanted 
to other regions that don’t need it. 
Brazil does not have the problem of 
entering into war with its neighbors. 
[…] Brazil was more reluctant to cede 
sovereignty during the Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso government than now. 
But this still persists because Brazil has 
a lot to lose when transferring compe-
tencies. Trade rates in the Santo André 
region are bigger than the total of trade 
exchanges of Uruguay!41» This dis-
course identifies the autonomist group 
40  Mario Mugnaini Junior, «O efeito 
Tango», Veja on-line, 18 July 2001. 
Available at http://veja.abril.com.
br/180701/p_084.html, Accessed on 2 
September 2012.
41  Member of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, author’s interview, 
Brussels, 16 October 2008.
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within Itamaraty (also called nationa-
lists), who are close to developmental 
assumptions regarding economy and 
defend an autonomous international 
projection of Brazil (Saraiva, 2010: 48).
Therefore, the sole result of the sum-
mit in Ouro Preto in 2004 regarding 
parliamentary reform, was the CMC 
decision 49/2004. This authorized the 
JPC to take all necessary steps for the 
establishment of the parliament until 
December 2006. Unexpectedly, the 
JPC managed to complete this duty in 
time: the Constitutive Protocol of the 
Mercosur Parliament was ready to be 
approved by the Council in December 
2005 and during 2006 it was ratified by 
all national parliaments. Parlasur was 
officially inaugurated during a solemn 
session in Brasilia, in December 2006, 
and began its work sessions in May 
2007 in its headquarters in Montevi-
deo. The Parliament is composed of 18 
parliamentarians nominated by each 
national congress, but representatives 
are to be elected in the future by univer-
sal suffrage in a number proportional 
to the population of member states. The 
Rules of Procedure establish the forma-
tion of transnational political groups 
and a system of different majorities 
according to which decisions should 
be taken, thus replacing traditional 
methods related to consensus and na-
tionality. Nevertheless, the Parliament 
has only a consultative status and no 
power over Mercosur legislative pro-
cedures. 
Parlasur was part of Lula’s go-
vernment double strategy regarding 
regionalism. It was a tactic to accept 
Mercosur and, at the same time, to 
promote punctual changes in the bloc. 
In Marco Aurélio Garcia’s words, 
«regionalism must be framed by gua-
rantees of democracy and efficiency. 
Fundamental questions of integration 
require a permanent forum capable of 
expressing the societies of Mercosur 
states. The Mercosur Parliament may 
advance in a progressive and firm 
manner»42. Nevertheless, new regional 
initiatives were launched, closer to 
PT’s ideas regarding Latin America and 
Itamaraty’s autonomist principles. In 
the period 2007-2010 Mercosur was 
still important, but the weight of re-
gional integration for the international 
uprising of Brazil had diminished (Ra-
manzini & Vigevani, 2010: 59). In this 
perspective, Mercosur was considered 
«completely insufficient to the demands 
of integration nowadays. The institu-
tional heritage of Mercosur is much 
more related to its hegemonic liberal 
past than to the future of Latin Ameri-
can integration. That is why Unasur or 
future organizations of Latin American 
states tend to be more dynamic»43. 
Conclusion
This paper aimed to analyze Brazil-
ian policy for regionalism under Lula’s 
42  Marco Aurélio Garcia, Declaration to the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee of 
Mercosur, 7 July 2006.
43  Member of the Executive Directory of PT, 
author’s interview, Brasília, 4 April 2009.
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government. Mercosur seemed to be 
the main topic of the external agenda 
during Lula’s first mandate, while in the 
second period priorities in the foreign 
affairs were enlarged and diversified. 
We have shown that the strategy con-
cerning regional integration did not 
substantially change during the govern-
ment, but external constraints did. At 
the outset, the Brazilian government 
looked for deeper institutionalization in 
Mercosur in order to improve relations 
with Argentina, to avoid economic 
instability in the region and to counter 
North American efforts to create a free 
trade area in the Americas. Once this 
last trend had been reversed, Brazil was 
free to invest in more risky projects in 
Latin America, as well as to intensify 
ambitious attempts in the international 
arena prompted by the success of do-
mestic economy and social policies.
The main difference between Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso and Lula 
in relation to Mercosur was their dis-
course: the latter included the idea that 
integration was a strategic priority for 
the country. Regardless, this rhetoric 
may confirm the assumption that to 
affirm an idea may be a sign of its weak-
ness instead of its importance (Legro, 
1997: 35). Mentioning the relevance 
of Mercosur repeatedly without basing 
this discourse on coherent practices 
could attest its deficiencies. Lula’s gov-
ernment did not contribute to concrete 
progress in Latin American regionalism, 
which continues to be based on overlap-
ping and low-institutionalized initia-
tives. Mercosur has become a part of 
a broader strategy of South-American 
cooperation and serves as a legitimizing 
instrument for Brazilian expectations in 
the region and the world (Ramanzini & 
Vigevani, 2010: 52). Keeping an inter-
governmental apparatus to disguise the 
lack of productive integration assures 
the continuity of a low-impact regional-
ism and shows coherency with the goal 
of international insertion of the State, 
instead of concerted insertion within 
the region.
Over the last decade, Brazil has 
consolidated its image at the inter-
national level, but this credibility 
was not accompanied in the regional 
arena, where the country still faces 
functional difficulties44. Moreover, the 
participation in emerging groups such 
as the BRICS is characterized by an 
accentuated unilateralism, seen by the 
fact that these meetings often reflect 
the momentary interests of members. 
The return to unilateralism in politi-
cal dialogue and bilateralism in trade 
negotiations, points to the unexpected 
effects of this strategy in general as well 
as the critical ones at the regional level. 
How long will Mercosur States cope 
with the type of regionalism desired 
by Brazil? What might happen if these 
countries search for new international 
alliances, politically or commercially? 
These questions refer to the paradox of 
trying to rebuild international relations 
44  Centro de Estudos de Integração e 
Desenvolvimento e Universidad San 
Andrés. Argentina-Brasil: levando o 
relacionamento a um novo patamar, 
março 2010. p. 6.
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based on the old idea of the Nation-
State. A new model of regulation that 
favors the reorganization of forces at 
the international level and a more bal-
anced set of power relations shall result 
not only from new discourses, but also 
from innovative practices that surpass 
state-centric methods consolidated dur-
ing the 19th century.
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